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Introduction
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS of derivative lawsuits may, at first
glance, appear to be a fruitless exercise. Derivative lawsuits are a rarity
in corporate law literature-a topic with some degree of unanimity. In
her seminal article in 1991, Roberta Romano raised considerable con-
cerns about whether derivative suits actually improved corporate gov-
ernance or returned substantial benefits to shareholders.' Derivative
lawsuits are brought by aggrieved shareholders in the name of the
corporation to remedy corporate governance failures. 2 If the lawsuits
prove successful, the winnings are returned to the firm for the benefit
of all shareholders. 3 Even if no money is returned to the firm, the
pressure from litigation might be sufficient to force the firm to im-
prove its governance. Romano's study found that the only clear bene-
ficiaries of derivative lawsuits were lawyers who received attorneys' fees
* J.D., Stanford Law School, 2008; Non-Degree Masters, Kobe University, 2004; B.A.,
Dartmouth College, 2003. Associate, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP. My thanks to
Professor Amalia Kessler, Alan Devlin, and Daniel Molina for their support.
1. Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 55 (1991).
2. Derivative suits will be further defined infra in Part II of this Article.
3. Alessandro De Nicola defined a derivative suit as
the action commenced by a company shareholder against a third party (usually a
director or executive) in the name of the company, in order to make up for a
damage suffered because of the wrongdoing of the third party. The shareholder
plays the role of a nominal plaintiff and the company of a nominal defendant,
although the possible compensation for damages established by the judge will be
paid . . . to the corporation.
ALESSANDRO DE NicoLA, SHAREHOLDER SuITs: THE ROLES AND MOTIVATIONS OF MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS AND DIREcroRS IN DERIVATIVE SuITs 22 (2007) (describing derivative suits in
the United States, Italy, Germany, and England).
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from settled cases. 4 Much of the following literature has echoed Ro-
mano's claims, with few strong indications that derivative suits pro-
vided any significant governance benefits.
Considering the poor domestic track record, an analysis of inter-
national derivative suits should be relatively unexciting, especially in
Japan and Italy. Japan and Italy are both civil law legal systems, origi-
nally based on the French and German models. 5 Generally, derivative
suits are thought to be highly dependent on the American legal sys-
tem because of its powerful discovery tools, high attorneys' fees, and
strong preferences for settlement. In short, it seems unlikely that de-
rivative suits would be an important corporate governance mechanism
in foreign systems when it appears to perform so poorly domestically.
Despite a mixed track record and academic appraisal, laws regu-
lating derivative suits in Italy and Japan have been liberalized signifi-
cantly over the past twenty years. Both Japan and Italy have
substantially revised their corporate codes over the last decade. Revi-
sions in the Italian Corporate Code in 1998 and 2004 added flexibility
for companies regarding their corporate governance. Japan began
changing its corporate laws in 1992, culminating in the New Company
4. In her research of derivative suits in the United States, Roberta Romano found
that the only net benefit of the suits was the fees collected by the plaintiffs attorney. Ro-
mano, supra note 1, at 84 ("The principal beneficiaries of the litigation [ I appear to be
attorneys."). She found that "differential indemnification rights, insurance policy exclu-
sions, and plaintiffs' counsel as the real party-in-interest creates powerful incentives to set-
tle," with 83 of 128 resolved suits in her survey settling. Id. at 57, 60. The development of
modern directors and officers ("D&O") insurance created one of the strongest incentives:
if parties settle, both sides will be reimbursed. Id. at 57; see also Bernard Black et al., Outside
Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1055 (2006) (discussing D&O insurance and an analysis
of the exposure of outside directors of public companies to liability not covered by the
company or D&O insurance). This result is exclusive of significant corporate governance
improvement: attorneys' fees are significant even if recovery is limited, and only a limited
number of settlements resulting in monetary recovery-46 of 83 in Romano's survey, while
75 of 83 paid attorneys' fees. Id. at 61. The third and most significant criticism of derivative
suits is that they are simply ineffective. Even if derivative suits were underutilized and a
substantial amount of the benefits accrued to the plaintiffs' counsel, a target firm could
have residual benefits in terms of corporate governance changes mandated by the settle-
ment agreement. Yet, Romano concluded that (1) attorneys were the principal benefi-
ciaries of derivatives suits, and there was little evidence of specific deterrence, with only
increased top management turnover in sued firms; (2) general deterrence is probably
weak; and (3) there was mixed evidence of indirect benefits, in particular advantages for
block-shareholders. Id. at 84-85. Finally, she offered the idea that legal rules are a public
good, and improvements and clarifications accrue to all.
5. The Japanese legal system was modified to include common law conventions dur-
ing the American occupation. For more details, see IKUO SUGAWARA, THE CURRENT SITUA-
TION OF CLAss Ac-rioN IN JAPAN 1-3 (2008), available at http://globalclassactions.stanford.
edu/PDF/JapanNationalReport.pdf.
[Vol. 43
DERIVATIVE LAWSUITS IN ITALY AND JAPAN
Law of 2006,6 which incorporated all of the minor changes from the
previous years into one comprehensive code. Not only did these mod-
ernizations substantially change corporate law in both countries, they
also introduced numerous changes in the nature of derivative suits.
These changes have resulted, at least in Japan, in several shareholder
plaintiff victories and an active derivative suit industry. In contrast, the
Italian derivative suit industry remains moribund despite increased ac-
cessibility to derivative suits. 7
The changes in corporate laws in Italy and Japan raise a number
of questions about derivative suits and imported laws in general. First,
are derivative suits culturally dependent? Second, if derivative suits are
not culturally dependent, what elements are necessary for their suc-
cessful incorporation into national laws? In this Article, these ques-
tions will be answered, bearing in mind a framework developed by
Gunther Teubner. Teubner proposed that imported law should be
understood as an ongoing interaction between social and legal pres-
sures-an irritant rather than a transplant.8 Not only does a major
change in one area significantly affect the other area, but neither
track can be viewed in isolation. More importantly, the future legal
and social ramifications of transplantation cannot be predicted
accurately.
When viewed from a Teubnerian perspective, several points be-
come apparent. Foremost, failure to implement derivative suits is not
due to systematic inadequacies or broad cultural differences. That is
to say, the lack of discovery or stereotypes, like Japanese non-litigious-
ness or Italian political corruption, have not been decisive in limiting
derivative suit use. Rather, the social relevance of derivative suits has
been the critical element in the acceptance and development of do-
mestic derivative law. The success of imported law is dependent on its
ability to irritate an aggrieved but heretofore impotent social group or
provide advantageous tools to established players. Laws must apply to
needs in order for them to be incorporated and utilized. In Japan,
6. Kaishah6 [Company Law], http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/CAl_
4_2.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2009).
7. There were no Italian derivitive suits filed between 1998 and 2006. Id. at 248. De
Nicola attributes this to endogenous and systematic problems, including the high thresh-
old for suits (2.5%) and characteristics of the domestic legal system. DE NicOLA, supra note
3, at 254.
8. Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law
Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998). Teubner is a prominent academic,
well-known for developing a social theory of law. The irritant framework developed in his
article tries to introduce new forces into standard legal transplant analysis to explain how
laws are received in new cultures. Id.
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legal reform of derivative suits created a remedy to a group of plain-
tiffs and lawyers that had been unable to press their claims in court. In
Italy, the derivative reforms were ultimately redundant to existing
players and out of the reach of new potential plaintiffs.
These examples might indicate how the likelihood of transplant
success can be increased. It is necessary for imported law to interact
with domestic society in order to become part of a country's living law.
In Italy, the high threshold cost of filing a derivative suit limited any
general response to the legal change. While it is unlikely that an Ital-
ian derivative suit industry would be similar to the United States due
to the unpredictability of imported law, if the law permitted social in-
teraction, some form of derivative suits could become part of the Ital-
ian legal framework. For imported laws to become relevant, there
must be irritation of the social bylaws and the legal thresholds must be
low enough to permit interactions between law and social elements,
elements that were present in the Japanese example.
Part I will introduce some of the comparative frameworks that
have dominated discussions about legal transplants, in addition to in-
troducing Teubner's model in detail. Part II introduces corporate gov-
ernance and derivative suits, in particular Romano's criticism of their
efficacy. Part III provides an extended look at derivative suits in Italy
and Japan using the Teubnerian model. Part 1V builds on Part III by
comparing derivative suits in Japan and Italy to highlight the major
distinctions.
I. Comparative Framework
Empirical research on what kind of corporate law provides the
greatest returns in socioeconomic wealth, and how to effectively trans-
plant it, is a frequent topic of academic debate. Corporate law is con-
cerned with internal company relations, in particular between the
owners and managers of a company.9 This debate has both important
academic appeal and significant real world consequences. The Inter-
national Monetary Fund ("IMF") and World Bank have attempted to
determine corporate law best practices and have tied loans to strug-
gling governments to the implementation of corporate law reform. 10
9. This builds on the theory of the firm, whereby ownership and management are
separated, and agency costs become the primary concern. Agency costs occur due to the
different interests and priorities of ownership and management. Corporate law is con-
cerned with how to minimize these costs.
10. Katharina Pistor et al., Innovation in Corporate Law, J. CoMP. ECON. STUD. 676, 677
(2003).
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With the fall of the "Asian Tigers"' I and the strong resurgence of the
American economy, particularly the dot-corns, American corporate
law and governance ascended as the model for promoting economic
growth and the rule of law. 12 This change is worrisome, though, due
to evidence that simply importing foreign law is generally insufficient
to cause desired domestic change. Teubner's approach to imported
law, discussed below, provides a compromise between the two ex-
tremes and recognizes if and when static elements will most strongly
resist imported law.
The debate concerning the evolution of global corporate law can
be best understood in terms of the "convergence" and "path depen-
dency" schools of thought. Regarding the former, Henry Hansmann
and Reinier Kraakman titled their provocative article "The End of His-
tory for Corporate Law," and argued that the turn of century would
witness global corporate law gravitating towards a standard of share-
holder primacy.13
The basic law of corporate governance-indeed, most of corporate
law-has achieved a high degree of uniformity across developed
market jurisdictions, and continuing convergence towards a single
standard is most likely.... There is no longer any serious competi-
tor to the view that corporate law should principally strive to in-
crease long-term shareholder value. 14
This vision is expansive, indicating that even countries that do
not share the traits of American corporations, including widely dis-
persed ownership, will ultimately succumb to the American corporate
governance model. 1
5
11. The Asian Tigers were the rapidly growing economies in East Asia during the
1990s, prior to the 1997 Asian financial crisis. They generally included Hong Kong, India,
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand.
12. This assumption has undoubtedly lost some of its luster during the 2008-2009
credit crisis.
13. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 439 (2001). But see Teubner, supra note 8, at 24 ("Despite liberalization of the
world markets[,] . . . the somewhat surprising result of the last thirty years is the establish-
ment of more than one form of advanced capitalism."). This also reaches back to the Berle-
Dodd debate of the 1930s regarding whether the board of directors owed a duty to just
shareholders or to a broader constituency. See KLAusJ. Hovr & GUNTHER TEUBNER, CORPO-
RATE GOVERNANCE AND DIREcroRs' REsPONSIBILITIES: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIOLOGIC.
ANALYSES ON CORPORATE SOCIAL REsPONSIBILrTY 149-51 (1985) (describing the initial Berle-
Dodd debate).
14. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 439.
15. Id. at 462-64. Hansmann and Kraakman argue in particular that insiders' political
clout will fail to protect them as they inefficiently plunder the firm, prompting exit by
shareholders. Id. Similarly, insiders who preserve their firms and protections will become
increasingly irrelevant. Id.
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The contrasting path dependency model argues that corporate
governance has static elements that will resist convergence. Path de-
pendency argues that law is not changing rapidly, and even superior
law will fail due to entrenched domestic factors. The application of a
path dependency model to corporate governance provides one reason
why effective corporate law reforms are not universally implemented.
Path dependence posits that "the pattern that develops will turn on a
set of initial conditions driven by factors other than efficiency, and
with the passage of time will prove costly to change even if a different
pattern later becomes more efficient."16 Lucian Bebchuck and Mark
Roe provide two models of path dependence, including structure-
driven path dependence-the direct effect that initial ownership
structure has on subsequent structures-and rule-driven path depen-
dence, which "arises from the effect that initial ownership structures
have on subsequent structures through their effect on the legal rules
governing corporations."'17 Bebchuck and Roe argue that corporate
law fits this model.' 8
The more extreme view is epitomized in the socio-cultural works
of Pierre Legrand, whose writing against a universal European civil
code emphasizes the insurmountable differences between national
cultures.' 9 Legrand's rhetoric implies that law is not portable but
16. Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the
Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HAIv. L. REv. 1641, 1662 (2006).
17. Lucian Arye Bebchuck & MarkJ. Roe, A Theory of Corporate Ownership and Govern-
ance, 52 STAN. L. REv. 127, 129 (1999).
18. Id.
19. Pierre Legrand, Against a European Civil Code, 60 MOD. L. REv. 44, 61 (1997) ("Eu-
rope's distinctive circumstances throughout its history have repeatedly involved the recog-
nition of insurmountable alterities arising from within."). But see Teubner, supra note 8, at
14 ("[Legrand's thesis is] a contemporary reformulation of Montesquieu's culturalist skep-
ticism against the easy transfer of legal institutions, but with the important modification
that the 'esprit des lois' is less a reflection of a national culture, but rather, of a specific
legal culture."). Teubner further questioned how Legrand's thesis will "avoid the fatal ca-
lamities of any approach to 'gesellschafiliche Totalitat[,]' to 'totality of societyj,' in which
each legal element reflects the whole societal culture and vice versa?" Id. He wrote:
How will such an appeal to the totality of cultural meaning, to the ensemble of
deep structures of law and to society's culture tout court be translated into detailed
analyses of interaction between law and culture? Legrand's still rather modest
efforts stand in a somewhat strange contrast to the sweeping claims of his general
programme. Secondly, how will he account for the manifold successful institu-
tional transfers among Western societies that have taken place rapidly and
smoothly? And thirdly,, does his own transfer into legal discourse of anthropologi-
cal culturalist knowledge, which presumes that legal phenomena are deeply cul-
turally embedded, take into account fragmentation, differentiation, separation,
closure of discourses that is so typical for the modem and post-modern experi-
ence? Does Legrand adequately reflect the double fragmentation of global society
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there are numerous examples to the contrary.20 This represents the
most extreme of opinions and it seems likely that certain laws rely on a
larger social fabric, and others offer overwhelming benefits innately.
The convergence and path dependency arguments represent two
extremes that can be separately rebutted with real world evidence. 21
In examining corporate law issues comparatively, it makes sense to use
a framework that can account for social, political, and legal differ-
ences. Here, Teubner's irritants comparative law model, which fo-
cuses on the interaction between social and legal factors in successful
legal adoption, has some critical advantages. Teubner's work provides
an interpretative framework for analyzing why imported law often fails
to have an impact or has a radically different impact than expected.
In contrast to both convergence and path dependency,
Teubner's approach emphasizes the organic nature of legal develop-
ment. Analyzing how foreign law is incorporated into a system raises a
number of questions. For example, the convergence/path depen-
dency debate establishes a binary system, with economic pressure at
one end, and political or historical pressures at the other. It would
seem desirable that rather than one factor completely dominating, a
number of different factors should apply with different strengths. For
example, certain countries might resist changes in their privacy rights
due to strongly path dependent reasons, like abuses during an earlier
fascist regime.22 Similarly, limited areas of corporate law and regula-
which consists not only in polyculturalism which he speaks about but also in deep
cleavages between discourses which he tends to neglect?
Id.
20. See Scott H. Mollett, Sarbanes-Oxley § 307 Domestically and Abroad: Will § 307 Lead to
International Change?, 11 DuQ. Bus. L.J. 1 (2008).
21. Research following these two articles provides evidence in favor of both argu-
ments; indeed, as with most polar arguments, both sides' arguments embody more than
their fair share of the truth. Later work by Pistor and others found that "the pattern of
legal change does indeed differ from those found in origin countries. Legal change is
much less gradual, but tends to be erratic or stagnant even during periods of rapid socio-
economic developments." Katharina Pistor et al., The Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-
Country Comparison, 23 U. PA.J. INT'L ECON. L. 791, 870 (2002). Other scholars have simi-
larly noted that widely-dispersed shareholders are the exception, with the more common
form of corporate ownership with a controlling shareholder becoming the focus of debate.
This highlights the problem with the convergence debate: numerous countries that are not
shareholder-centric perform quite well and do not appear to be converging.
22. Whistieblower protections are an example of a controversial legal import. In con-
trast to strong American support, whistleblowing conjures images of fascist government or
betrayal of traditional corporate culture. Ruth V. Aguilera, Corporate Governance and Director
Accountability: An Institutional Comparative Perspective, 16 BIT. J. MGMT. 39, 43 (2005) ("[I] t
is hard to imagine that firms in Japan might introduce a whistle-blowing hotline."); John
Gibeaut, Culture Clash, 92 A.B.A. J. 10, 10 (2006) ("Americans like to elevate whis-
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tion, where the primary interests are multinational corporations,
might be driven by economic concerns.23 Traditional comparative law
provides some guidance in how to view the relationship between law
and society. In this context, Teubner's irritant framework-which
utilizes a sociological approach-provides an attractive framework for
understanding how social and legal pressures interact, not only in the
initial acceptance of a transplant, but in its continued domestic
implementation.
In "Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying
Law Ends Up in New Divergences," Teubner reconciles culturalist and
legalist comparative arguments into a framework of co-evolving social
and legal trajectories. 24 Teubner argues that laws are not transplanted
into a culture; rather, they are social and legal irritants. 25 As an irri-
tant, foreign law is not simply placed within a domestic code-it is the
starting point whereby both the law and the domestic culture are al-
tered and dynamically reconstructed. 26
tie[blowers] to near folk-hero status, from Daniel Ellsberg, who leaked the Pentagon Pa-
pers, to Sherron Watkins, who exposed the Enron Corp. financial scandal that in 2002
moved Congress to pass the fraud-busting Sarbanes-Oxley Act."). Continued Gibeat:
Say whislle[blower] in Germany, however, and the term most likely conjures up
memories of the Gestapo, Adolf Hitler's secret police .... So it's probably no
wonder that Germany and France have taken the lead in resisting provisions of
the Sarbanes-Oxley that shield from retaliation corporate whistle-blowers who re-
port fraud and other financial irregularities.
Id.; see also Mollett, supra note 20, at 16-17 (discussing how Sarbanes-Oxley has been re-
ceived internationally).
23. For example, the debate over which accounting method to use (Generally Acc-
cepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP") or Financial Accounting Standards Board
("FASB")) is one area that has achieved substantial convergence.
24. Teubner examined the importation of "bona fides" into English corporate law.
Bona fides (or "good faith") is a standard component of continental law that has been
vigorously resisted by English courts. Teubner, supra note 8, at 11. Teubner discusses
whether the doctrine will be rejected or interacted with, but later argues that this is a false
dichotomy, and that irritation is the best mechanism for understanding the uptake of legal
imports. Id.
25. Id. at 12 ("To be sure, transplant makes sense insofar as it describes legal import/
export in organismic, not in mechanistic terms. Legal institutions cannot be easily moved
from one context to the other, like the 'transfer' of a part from one machine into the
other. They need careful implantation and cultivation in the environment. But 'transplant'
creates the wrong impression that after a difficult surgical operation the transferred mate-
rial will remain identical with itself playing its old role in the new organism. Accordingly, it
comes down to the narrow alternative: repulsion or integration.").
26. Id. ("[Imported law] irritates law's 'binding arrangements.' It is an outside noise
which creates wild perturbations in the interplay of discourses within these arrangements
and forces them to reconstruct internally not only their own rules but to reconstruct from
scratch the alien element itself. 'Legal irritants' cannot be domesticated; they are not trans-
formed from something alien into something familiar, not adapted to a new cultural con-
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In examining how laws are imported into domestic legal systems,
Teubner proposes four theses:
1. Law's contemporary ties to society are no longer comprehen-
sive, but are highly selective and vary from loose coupling to
tight interwovenness.
2. They are no longer connected to the totality of the social, but
to diverse fragments of society.
3. Where, formerly, law was tied to society by its identity with it,
ties are now established via difference.
4. They no longer evolve in a joint historical development but in
the conflictual interrelation of two or more independent evo-
lutionary trajectories. 27
These theses provide varied levels of cultural dependence for
laws. This recognizes the abstraction of some laws away from society to
the legislature and the tight cultural binding of some laws. 28 Teubner
refers to the "coupling" between law and society to indicate the sever-
ity of influence changes in one area-law or society-can have in
others; similarly, this indicates the resistance a given irritant may face.
Furthermore, the transplants do not exist within a legal vac-
uum-there will be active resistance to change. This echoes the path
dependency argument, that entrenched legal, political, and social in-
terests may resist even an in-the-aggregate beneficial change if it is
personally disadvantageous. 2 9 This leads to what Teubner refers to as
"the Janus-like character of law's binding arrangements ....
[E]conomic institutions are constraint and incentive structures that
influence cost benefit calculations of economic actors, while legal in-
stitutions are ensembles of legally valid rules that structure the resolu-
text, rather they will unleash an evolutionary dynamic in which the external rule's meaning
will be reconstructed and the internal context will undergo fundamental change.").
27. Id. at 18. Regarding the first and second points, this is one area where Teubner
distinguishes his work from Kahn-Freund's earlier work. Teubner argues that when Kahn-
Freund expressed his belief in the political system as the agent for change in the 1970s, it
was dependent on the older European totalitarian states. Id. at 22. Teubner further argues
that, "[f] rom the somewhat sobering perspective of the nineties, this seems to overestimate
the importance of the political system at the expense of other social systems." Id.
28. Of course, Teubner goes into far greater detail than this, noting that
even in areas of loose coupling, where an institutional transfer is easier to accom-
plish, this is not as 'mechanical' as ... the analogy of changing a carburetor [sic]
in an engine .... Even in those situations when the law is rather 'technical,'
insulated from its social context, legal transfer is not smooth and simple but has
to be assimilated to the deep structure of the new law, to the social world con-
structions that are unique to the different legal culture.
Id. at 19.
29. This also highlights a collective action problem that often thwarts meaningful
change.
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tion of conflicts." 30 Imported law is an irritant, not a transplant, that
agitates both socially and legally. Change is required in order for it to
be incorporated into either track, which in turn affects the other
track. There is a co-evolving dynamic, with each side provoking the
other, reacting to distinctly social or legal confrontations, and thus
forcing the other track to shift accordingly. This progression is unpre-
dictable, premised on irritating law's "binding arrangements" and cre-
ating an entirely new internal dynamic. 31
Teubner's framework is extremely advantageous in analyzing the
results of legal importation for two reasons. Foremost, it requires an
examination of contemporaneous legal and social developments, es-
pecially in regards to how law actually functions: irritants should be
defined by their actual functions, not just the words on the paper.
Secondly, this framework highlights how each set of factors can affect
the initial period of enactment and the continuing dialogue can mod-
ify the implications of a law. Teubner's framework encourages a
deeper look into cultural explanations, and emphasizes the letter of
the law and importance of change-a depth of inspection that a basic
convergence, culturalist, or path dependency approach could never
achieve.
II. Derivative Suits: Their Role and Their Interactions
Corporations and shareholders are part of most modern econo-
mies, and the protections of the modern corporation are essential for
developing competitive companies. Corporate laws that affect these
rules are diverse, varying both in their goals and their implementa-
tion. This Article examines how these laws compare when corporate
governance fails and shareholders, the nominal owners of the firm,
are required to protect their interests. Derivative suits are not the only
form of shareholder protection nor are they the most drastic. Rather,
"[1] iability rules are thought to be called into play when the primary
governance mechanisms . . . fail in their monitoring efforts but the
misconduct is not of sufficient magnitude to make a control change
worthwhile. '3 2 This Part will introduce the standard corporate govern-
ance model and introduce derivative suits in the context of some of
the alternatives available to aggrieved shareholders. This Part will also
30. Id. at 27.
31. Id. at 12.
32. Romano, supra note 1, at 55.
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introduce some of the tools available to shareholders in the United
States, Italy, and Japan.
A. Corporate Governance
Corporate governance attempts to limit the problems that occur
when firm management and ownership are separated. In 1932, Adolf
Berle and Gardinier Means wrote that the widely dispersed ownership
of public firms meant that individual shareholders were too dispersed
to control the firm, which resulted in the hiring of professional execu-
tives. 33 This governance gap introduces agency costs, the premium
necessary to ensure proper actions by the hired managers. 34 Corpo-
rate governance minimizes these costs within a cost-benefit frame-
work: management must be monitored but the costs of restraining
management misbehavior should not exceed the benefits of manage-
ment's role. At least recently, a law and economics perspective has
dominated, one where market transparency and liquidity provide suf-
ficient restrictions on abusive managers.3 5 This framework places a
heavy burden on shareholders and their ability to influence manage-
ment both indirectly, through a corporation's share price, and di-
rectly, using voting rights and pursuing shareholder suits.
The most common conception of corporate governance is the
American shareholder-primacy model. Hansmann and Kraakman de-
scribe the standard model as:
[U] Itimate control over the corporation should rest with the share-
holder class; the managers of the corporation should be charged
with the obligation to manage the corporation in the interests of its
shareholders; other corporate constituencies... should have their
interests protected by contractual and regulatory means rather
than through participation in corporate governance; noncontrol-
ling shareholders should receive strong protection from exploita-
33. See ADOLF BERLE & GARDINIER MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (Transaction Publishers 1990) (1933).
34. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Agency Costs and the Theory of the Firm, 3
J. FIN. ECON. 80, 85 (1976) ("We define an agency relationship as a contract under which
one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform
some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority
.* .. The principal can limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate
incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the aberrant
activities of the agent."). Easterbrook and Fischel define agency costs as "the combination
of monitoring, bonding, and residual costs." FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAV 10 (1991).
35. EASTERBROOK & FiSCHEL, supra note 34, at 25 ("[T]he most powerful device for
protecting participants in the venture-liquid markets with professional investors setting
prices-applies exclusively to investors, principally equity investors.").
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tion at the hands of controlling shareholders; and the market value
of the publicly traded corporation's shares is the principal measure
of its shareholders' interests. 3 6
This builds on the principal-agent model, where shareholders are
the principals and the management their agents. 37
An important element of this corporate governance structure is
the board of directors. The board of directors is one of the solutions
to the agency problem, a monitoring group that can limit manage-
ment excesses. Originally, insiders with firm-specific knowledge popu-
lated this group and intended to enable reasonable, macro decision-
making. The twenty-first century board, however, is populated with in-
dependent directors.3 8 Independent directors have become almost
mandatory-they are an important component for having corporate
decisions reviewed with the lenient business judgment rule under Del-
aware's jurisprudence; the New York Stock Exchange requires most
listed companies to have a majority of independent directors, and cer-
tain committees must be composed of independent members. 39
Over the last decade, however, comparative and empirical pieces
have surged, many prompted by the realization that corporations
managed by widely dispersed shareholders were not only a minority in
the United States, but also an exception internationally. In particular,
in "Law and Finance," 40 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes,
Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny examined forty-nine countries
and compared the effectiveness of legal families-common law and
civil law-in implementing "good" corporate law-as measured by mi-
nority shareholder protection. Their results showed large differences
in the quality of law in different legal families, with common-law coun-
36. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 441-42.
37. This model has received a fair share of criticism, much of it based on the inappli-
cability of the principal-agent model to drastically more complex relations between dis-
persed shareholders and management. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy:
The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 547, 550 (2003) (proposing
director primacy as the goal of corporate governance).
38. SeeJeffrey N. Gordon, Independent Directors and Stock Market Prices: The New Corporate
Governance Paradigm, 59 STAN. L. REv. 1465, 1472-99 (2007) (offering a narrative on the
rise of independent directors).
39. Mollett, supra note 20, at 4-5; see also E. Norman Veasey, State-Federal Tension in
Corporate Governance and the Professional Responsibilities of Advisors, 28J. Corn'. L. 441, 443
(2003) (listing areas where Sarbanes-Oxley and security exchange regulation has man-
dated changes in state corporate codes, including: "the composition of the board of direc-
tors; the composition of the audit, compensation and nomination/governance
committees; some of the activities and requirements of the board and its committees; de-
tail on definitions of independence of directors; reporting and certification requirements
of the CEO and the CFO").
40. Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. EcoN. 1113 (1998).
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tries affording the best legal protection to shareholders and French-
civil-law countries providing the worst.41 This raises questions con-
cerning how effectively substitutes can mitigate the impact of bad law,
why countries with an abundance of controlling shareholders perform
well, and ultimately, how corporate law should be modified to be most
effective. 42
B. Alternatives to Derivative Suits
Corporate governance is not perfect and there continues to be a
risk that the firm's nominal owners may be dissatisfied with the per-
formance of management. Boards of directors and shareholder suits
are mechanisms designed to limit the excesses of management. They
are not exclusive, however, and a number of alternatives exist. These
range from simple measures for a shareholder to protect their invest-
ment, to stronger tactics for removing directors and directly influenc-
ing the firm. For example, liquid markets might facilitate easy exit by
aggrieved shareholders, which has a lower cost to the average share-
holder than bringing suit. Similarly, the legal and social environment
might limit the need to resort to derivative suits-controlling share-
holders might have sufficient incentive to monitor management and
prevent ill behavior.
Derivative suits, the focus of this Article, are brought by a share-
holder against a third party, typically a member of the board, for a
breach of fiduciary duty with the recovery going to the company.43
Derivative suits are so named because the shareholder's right to sue is
derived from the company. A derivative suit has two components:
"one action against directors to oblige them to act against wrongdo-
ers, the second against the company whose rights the shareholder
wants to enforce."44 Thus, in order to file a derivative suit in the
United States, a plaintiff must prove that they have made a good faith
effort to convince the company to remedy the breach of fiduciary
41. Id. at 1129. Italy was included as a French-civil-law type country and Japan was put
within the German tradition of civil law countries, despite some strong common law
tendencies.
42. Gordon, supra note 38, at 1535-40 (arguing that independent directors have be-
come pivotal in protecting shareholder rights).
43. Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation:
Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REv. 133, 143 (2004). For a detailed history of
the development of derivative suits jurisprudence, see Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., The Forgotten
Derivative Suit, 61 VAND. L. REx'. 387 (2008) (examining the decline of derivative suits in the
United States and whether shareholders benefit).
44. DE NIcoLA, supra note 3, at 23.
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duty. This includes a demand that the board file a suit on behalf of
the company and, generally, upon the board's failure to file the suit,
the plaintiff may handle the derivative suit himself.45. If the board
elects to pursue the claim and accede to the shareholder's demand,
the original shareholder plaintiff is removed from the process. Deriva-
tive actions are only a subset of shareholder litigation options; share-
holders can also sue directly-as an individual or class-and receive
the benefit of their suit directly.4 6 The procedural hurdles for each
type of suit differ.
Shareholders have a variety of available recourses other than de-
rivative suits. One thing that may limit the utilization of derivative suits
in importing countries is the availability of satisfactory alternatives. Po-
tential plaintiffs will do a cost-benefit assessment when considering
their options. For example, the most basic recourse is the right to exit.
Ownership of public shares generally provides a shareholder the right
to sell their shares at a market price. Given limited options, exit is
often the easiest and cheapest solution;47 similarly, given high thresh-
45. This is one odd area of United States derivative suits. Italy, for example, does not
require such a demand of the directors. Id. at 241. The directors of the company have the
power to institute the lawsuit. Id. at 210. This is reasonable because the board of directors
is in a position to know more about the company than a shareholder and should be best
equipped to decide if a suit is warranted against a board or management member who has
mismanaged the firm. Id. If the board refuses the demand, however, and the decision is
not protected by the business judgment rule, this power devolves to the initial third party
plaintiff, who can conduct the suit for the corporation. Id. For a more detailed discussion
of the demand requirement, see Davis, supra note 43, at 396-400 (describing the develop-
ment of the demand requirement and the holding in Aronson v. Lewis requiring the plain-
tiff to show particularized facts that indicate the directors were not disinterested and that
the decision was not a valid product of the business judgment rule); see also DE Nicot-A,
supra note 3, at 33 (stating that the demand requirement is not treated seriously and often
not included in newer state company laws).
46. Davis notes that derivative suits are a component of a flexible U.S. governance
system that, while not having perfect laws, places a strong emphasis on disclosure and
engages in a holistic approach to enforcing fiduciary duties. Davis, supra note 43, at 388.
Within this system, "[t]he critical issue, therefore, is who performs the fiduciary evalua-
tion." Id. "Traditionally, courts have exercised principal responsibility through shareholder
derivative suits." Id.; see also Larry E. Ribstein, International Implications of Sarbanes-Oxley:
Raising the Rent on U.S. Law, 3J. CoRP. L. STUDS. 299, 301 (2003) ("Federal securities regu-
lation in the United States for 70 years has been explicitly based on the fundamental prin-
ciple that the law regulates what issuers must say about their companies and not the types
of firms or securities that may be sold.").
47. See Mark D. West, The Pricing of Shareholder Derivative Actions in Japan and the United
States, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1436, 1474 (1994) [hereinafter West, Pricing of Actions] (discussing
how shareholders without the ability to voice their opinion will use exit as their sole means
to counter director misbehavior).
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olds for legal action it might be the only option. 48 Exit, of course, does
not allow for a direct recovery of losses, but the decrease in share
price resulting from a mass exit may have a chastising effect on man-
agement. In addition, extralegal or social pressures could be brought
to bear on companies, including complaints in newspapers49 or down-
grades by financial analysts. These represent passive pressures-ac-
tions that might affect the stock price and minimize shareholder
exposure to poor management, but do not actually hold the managers
accountable.
In addition, there may exist opportunities for shareholders to
take more direct action to rein in management excesses. Shareholders
generally have the right to vote, which may facilitate direct change in
the board of directors, who could in turn change the composition of
management.50 A shareholder could file a direct suit, whereby they
will personally recover for any inappropriate acts by the corporation, 51
or a securities class action suit.52 In the United States, state law reme-
dies provide a different path for chastising the board.
Extralegal measures are another option. Here, for example, a
shareholder can increase their holdings to increase their direct con-
trol over the company and reduce the agency problems. One option is
block holding of a significant amount of shares. 53 Another option,
used in Japan, is the cross-holding of shares by corporate affiliates to
consolidate firm ownership. In areas with bad law, controlling share-
48. Marco Ventoruzzo, Experiments in Comparative Corporate Law: The Recent Italian Re-
form and the Dubious Virtues of a Market for Rules in the Absence of Effective Regulatory Competition,
40 TEX. INT'L L.J. 113, 140 (2004).
49. West, Pricing of Actions, supra note 47, at 1473-74.
50. See generally CHURCH LUCIER ET AL., WHY CEOs FALL: THE CAUSES AND CONSE-
QUENCES OF TURNOVER AT THE Top (2002), available at http://extfile.bah.com/livelink/live
link/ 1101 73/?func=doc.Fetch&nodeid=1 10173 (describing CEO firing trends).
51. DE NIcoLA, supra note 3, at 23 (noting that the shareholder is able to recover for a
"breach of his or her contractual rights as a shareholder").
52. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 43, at 133.
53. Gilson and Gordon argued that there is a point of tangency between agency costs
and problems that arise between controlling and non-controlling shareholders: "The pres-
ence of a controlling shareholder reduces the managerial agency problem, but at the cost
of the private benefits agency problem." RonaldJ. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling
Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 785, 785 (2003); see also MarkJ. Roe, Political Preconditions to
Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539, 539 (2000) ("Hence, pub-
lic firms[,] ... all else [being] equal, have higher managerial agency costs, and large-block
shareholding has persisted as a shareholders' best remaining way to control those costs.").
Romano also noted that there was statistically significant evidence that block-holders had
benefited from the availability of derivative suits. Romano, supra note 1, at 84-85.
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holders might be the best way to secure expected benefits from
shareholding.5 4
The nature of the market might significantly affect the options
available to shareholders. Corporate governance might not be the
ideal method to reduce corporate abuses; instead, revisions to securi-
ties law5 5 or increased market or self-regulation 5 6 might seriously re-
duce problems without requiring corporate governance mechanisms,
like derivative suits, to be utilized. These alternatives must be consid-
ered even more seriously in the international context, as the availabil-
ity of alternative methods may affect the actions taken by an aggrieved
shareholder.
In the United States, the traditional means of holding a firm ac-
countable have been the derivative suit, direct suit, class action, and
some level of shareholder activism. Each of these solutions provides a
different standard for filing and appeals to a different type of share-
holder. For example, shareholder activism might involve shareholders
with larger holdings pushing for their own slate of directors. Direct
suits target a breach of a shareholder's contractual rights while deriva-
tive suits attack failures at the director level of the corporation. Both
of these solutions require only minimal shareholdings. The array of
tools available to shareholders is somewhat complementary. It would
be understandable if exported derivative suits did not fill in the same
niche in their host countries.
54. Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Family Shareholders in Developing Countries: Anchoring
Relation Exchange, 60 STAN. L. REV. 633, 635 (2007) ("My hypothesis is that bad commercial
law, as opposed to just poor minority shareholder protection as contemplated by the Law
and Finance literature, breaks down the separation between equity distribution and firm
value. I posit that the presence of a controlling shareholder and, in particular, a family
controlling shareholder, allows the corporation to better conduct its business, but in a way
quite different than the potential for a controlling shareholder to more effectively police
the agency conflict between management and shareholders .. "). Even controlling share-
holders, however, may be able to develop portfolios that effectively cancel out the risk of
concentrated ownership.
55. John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities
Market Failure, 25J. CORP. L. 1, 26 (1999).
56. John C. Coffee,Jr., Convergence and Its Critics: What Are the Preconditions to the Separa-
tion of Ownership and Control?, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES, CONVERGENCE AND Di-
vERSiTy 83 (Joseph A. McCahery et al. eds., 2002); see also id. at 84 ("Alternatively, the
development of a pan-European securities market, possibly with listing and disclosure re-
quirements more demanding than those of existing European markets, could conceivably
provide the framework for the adoption of protections for minority shareholders that were
essentially similar to those enjoyed today in common law countries. More importantly the
key idea here is that of functional substitutes that provide alternative means to the same
end.").
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In contrast, as discussed below, Japan primarily makes available a
derivative suit, short-swing profit recovery mechanisms, and measures
specifically designed to counteract organized crime.57 More broadly
speaking, Mark West characterized the options available to a Japanese
shareholder as the legal options listed above and exit.58 Japan has also
historically relied on main banks, which monitored their clients for
abuses, and cross-holdings to maintain control over corporations and
limit corporate abuses. This assortment of tools differs from the
United States. When examining the use of derivative lawsuits, the in-
centives versus other remedies may differ significantly in comparison
to the United States. Similarly, Italy offers shareholders a distinctive
array of tools for enforcing their rights as owners of the corporation.
These mechanisms have different shareholder requirements than the
United States and provide a different set of options. Examining how
derivative suits fit within these alternatives is critical in determining
how they will be received. Similarly, assessing what social impediments
exist will indicate how they will evolve differently from their original
country. These differences and a Teubnerian approach will be the
heart of the next part.
III. Use of Derivative Suits Overseas
Despite concerns about the efficacy of derivative lawsuits and the
importance of United States legal mechanisms in supporting their
use, foreign countries have imported or otherwise implemented deriv-
ative suits. Many European nations have made derivative lawsuits avail-
able to aggrieved shareholders, although the use of these provisions
has varied and many countries see little utilization. 59 For example, re-
visions to the Italian corporate law in 1998 and 2004 failed to en-
courage any derivative suit filings.60 In contrast, changes to the
Japanese corporate code in 1993 and the subsequent 10,000% in-
crease in derivative suits filings indicates that legal restraints might be
the primary impediment to derivative suit use.61 This raises the ques-
57. Japan has also been reforming its class action laws. See Sugawara, supra note 5.
58. West, Pricing of Actions, supra note 47, at 1470-75.
59. Grechenig and Seykra list a number of countries that have derivative suit mecha-
nisms, including the Czech Republic, Spain, Slovakia, Austria, Bulgaria, and others. Kristof-
fel Grechenig & Michael Seykra, No Derivative Shareholder Suits in Europe, A Model of
Percentage Limits, Collusion and Residual Owners 3 (Columbia Univ. Sch. of Law Ctr. for Law
& Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 312, 2007). They note, however, that there has been
little use of these derivative suits in Europe. Id. at 2.
60. Ventoruzzo, supra note 48, at 140.
61. Mark D. West, Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence from Japan, 30 J. LEGAL STUn. 351,
352 (2001) (hereinafter West, Why Shareholders Sue].
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tion of why derivative suits are utilized in some countries and not
others.
This analysis depends on Teubner's framework for examining
how legal changes have been implemented in each country. First, the
derivative suit laws in each country will be described to highlight is-
sues that might significantly affect derivative suits. Second, the social
components that have significantly affected derivative suit adoption
will be highlighted. This includes latent domestic features that have
supported the use of derivative suits and an assessment of how legal
changes energized these elements. Acting as a mild irritant, changes
in the Japanese pricing model for derivative suits, combined with the
degradation of traditional corporate governance mechanisms led to
derivative suit utilization. The revisions appealed to aggrieved small
shareholders who would not otherwise have legal recourse. In con-
trast, significant legal changes have not been sufficient to energize, or
benefit from, latent social interests in Italy because they are largely
redundant to existing measures and can only be used by parties with
less expensive alternatives. What will be apparent is that social support
has been pivotal in the acceptance of derivative suits as part of the
domestic corporate governance framework. 62
A. Derivative Suits in Italy
Italian law has not been an archetypical model of "good" corpo-
rate law. In the 1998 Law and Finance survey, Italy scored poorly in the
shareholder rights index. 63 One area that corporate governance litera-
ture has examined is the presence of controlling shareholders rather
than disparate share holdings. This assumption is premised on the law
62. One question that will not be addressed in this Part of the Article is the normative
question of whether derivative suits are good. Roberta Romano and Mark West, at least to
some degree, have provided empirical evidence that suits do not significantly improve cor-
porate governance nor result in significant returns to shareholders. See Romano, supra note
1, at 67; West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 61, at 359. Neither author found evidence of
stock price increases after a derivative suit filing is announced. Romano, supra note 1, at 67;
West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 61, at 359. West extends this by noting that "share-
holders apparently do not expect to receive gains of any sort or magnitude from filing." Id.
at 359. Similarly, the stock prices of firms targeted by derivative suits showed little change
in Japan and the United States, indicating the market's ambivalence about the suits' ability
to cause significant improvement. Id. at 359. These peripheral benefits may be discussed,
even if the larger normative question is postponed until more empirical evidence is
available.
63. La Porta et al., supra note 40, at 1131. Italy actually scored very poorly, receiving a
positive mark only for the preemptive right to new issues. Id. It otherwise performed below
average for French-origin countries, a group that generally lagged in La Porta's survey. See
id.
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and finance argument that "entrepreneurs retain control to protect
themselves against the private benefit extraction by someone who
might subsequently assemble control if the entrepreneur gave it up. '64
Italian corporate ownership rates and quality of enforcement figures
have lagged the targets espoused in the literature: the proportion of
ownership by the largest three shareholders in the top ten domestic
firms had a mean of 58% and a median of 60% and the enforcement
variables were low, evinced by the fact that the efficiency of the judi-
cial system was a 6.75 and corruption a 6.13.65 Another indicator of
deficiencies in Italian corporate governance is the high control block
premium. The control block premium is the amount of firm value
assignable to holding a controlling block, with low premia being asso-
ciated with better governance. For example, Italian controlling owner-
ship is marked by a control block premium of 37%.66
Italy made major revisions to its corporate laws in 1998 and again
in 2004.67 These changes represent a significant step forward for the
Italian corporate code, at least on paper. The 1998 revisions included
improvements that modified quorums to promote blocking minori-
ties, ensuring freer disclosure to facilitate proxy fights, and additional
provisions for minority shareholders in the event of a compulsory
takeover.68 The 2004 revisions added the ability to issue different types
of shares and multiple corporate governance structures,69 building on
the 1998 reforms.7 0 Commentators have, however, expressed substan-
tial concern that progress on paper might fail to compel actual legal
change. 71 In particular, concerns about the judges' inability to effec-
tively implement laws and the strength of the laws might foreshadow
64. Gilson, supra note 16, at 1654.
65. La Porta et al., supra note 40, at 1143, 1147. In contrast, ownership rates in Ameri-
can andJapanese firms were closer to a mean of 20% and a median of 12%, with scores two
points higher on the enforcement criteria for both countries. Id. at 1130-31, 1143, 1147.
66. Gilson, supra note 16, at 1655. These results are consistent with Gilson's work,
which argues that controlling shareholders will extract higher premia in bad law states.
67. See L. A. Bianchi, Catherine A. Rogers & Marco Ventoruzzo, Legal Recourses to
Protect Shareholders' Interests, Remarks at the International Corporate Governance Net-
work 8th Annual Conference in Milan (July 18, 2002), available at http://www.icgn.org/
files/icgnmain/conferences/previoussconferences/milan_2002/luigi-bianchi.pdf (dis-
cussing the minority protections provided in the 1998 Testo Unico della Finanza corporate
reforms).
68. Id. at 2-5.
69. Ventoruzzo, supra note 48, at 115-16.
70. Luca Enriques, Do Corporate Law Judges Matter? Some Evidence from Milan, 3 EUR.
Bus. ORG. L. REv. 765, 780 (2002).
71. Id. at 767; Ventoruzzo, supra note 48, at 153.
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limited change in practice. 72 There are cultural-such as preferences
for corporate insiders-and legal explanations-the high bars for
bringing suits-that have been attributed to Italy's failure to rigor-
ously enforce its corporate law. Regarding derivative suits, the major
problem has been the gap between potential plaintiffs and available
law: Eligible plaintiffs have recourse to other established mechanisms,
while new plaintiffs are not included within the derivative suits
mechanism.
1. Italian Derivative Suit Mechanisms
Luca Enriques describes four shareholder litigation mechanisms
that are available to shareholders. Article 2393-bis is the derivative suits
mechanism and requires ownership of 2.5% of the outstanding shares
for listed firms, and 20% of the shares for an unlisted firm. 73 Share-
holders can also use three other mechanisms to influence the board.
First, Article 2377 allows a shareholder to bring suit to nullify resolu-
tions that violate the law or the company bylaws. 74 These suits are
often brought ostensibly for change and then used to increase minor-
72. Enriques, supra note 70, at 773-74.
73. Article 2393-bis of the Italian Civil Code States:
The company action for liability may be exercised also by members representing
at least one fifth of the capital or such different percentage indicated in the by-
laws which in any case cannot be greater than one third.
For companies making recourse to the market of risk capital, the action described
in the preceding paragraph may be exercised by the members representing one-
fortieth of the company's capital or such lower amount contemplated in the by-
laws.
The company must be convened in court and the deed of summons may be
served on it also in the person of the chairman of the board of auditors.
The members who intended to promote the action appoint, by majority of the
capital owned, one or more representatives for the exercise of the action and for
the fulfillment of the related acts.
If the request is accepted, the company pays the plaintiffs the judicial expendi-
tures and those incurred for the ascertainment of the facts which the judge
charges to the losing party or which may not be possible to recover upon enforce-
ment against them.
The members who initiated the action may abandon it or settle; any compensa-
tion for the waiver or settlement must be for the benefit of the company.
The provisions of the last paragraph of the preceding article apply to the action
described in this article.
Codice Civile [C.c.] art. 2393-bis (Italy), translated in THE ITALIAN CIVIL CODE AND COMPLE-
MENTARY LEGISLATION (Susanna Beltramo ed., Mario Beltramo et al. trans., Oxford Univer-
sity Press 2008) (1991) [hereinafter Italian Civil Code]. The percentage threshold was
lowered from 5% to 2.5% in 2005 with Article 3 of Law 262/2005. DE NicoLA, supra note 3,
at 79; Ventoruzzo, supra note 48, at 141.
74. "The resolutions not adopted in compliance with the law or the by-laws may be
challenged by the members not present, by the dissenting ones or those who did not ex-
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ity shareholder bargaining position. 75 Second, Article 2395 facially
permits recovery for director negligence or fraud. 76 Finally, under Ar-
ticle 2409, shareholders holding greater than 5% of outstanding
shares can complain if serious irregularities occur in the company's
management.77
While superficially this array of options appears to provide ag-
grieved shareholders with some remedy, shareholders are generally
unable to effectively bring suits against the board. To wit, the 1998
revisions the derivative suit mechanism has never been used.78 Enri-
ques attributed the anemic showing to the at-the-time high, 5% share
ownership threshold, while Marco Ventoruzzo attributes the failure to
(1) lack of economic incentives; and (2) civil procedure/professional
regulation problems.79 The abundance of shareholder options might
account for the underutilization by plaintiffs who have a number of
mechanisms for pressuring the board and which are familiar to their
lawyers. Enriques notes that remedies for specific problems are gener-
ally unavailable, forcing minority shareholders to use ostensible rea-
sons to strengthen their bargaining positions.80 In particular, a
plaintiff would need to advance the expenses for the litigation, which
would only be recoverable with victory. Second, there are neither con-
tingency suits nor extensive discovery which limits a lawyer's incentive
to take risks and build a strong case.
press a vote, by the directors, by the supervisory board[,1 or the board of auditors." Italian
Civil Code, supra note 73, art. 2377.
75. Enriques, supra note 70, at 785.
76. Italian Civil Code, supra note 73, art. 2395 ("The provisions of the preceding arti-
cles do not affect the right to compensation for damages of an individual member or third
person who has been directly injured as a result of malice, fraud or negligence of the
directors. The action may be exercised within five years from the act which damaged the
member or the third person."); Enriques, supra note 70, at 786.
77. Italian Civil Code, supra note 72, art. 2409. ("If there is a basis for suspicion of
serious irregularities in the management by the directors in violation of their duties, which
may damage the company or one of more of the controlled companies, the members rep-
resenting one-tenth of the company's capital or, in companies which make recourse to the
market of risk capital, one-twentieth of the company's capital, can report the facts to the
tribunal with a recourse to be served also on the company. The by-laws may provide for
lower percentages of participation."); Enriques, supra note 70, at 787-88.
78. Ventoruzzo, supra note 48, at 141.
79. Id. But see Grechenig et al., supra note 59, at 3 (arguing that smaller shareholders
have few incentives to file derivative suits due to cost-benefit asymmetries, and that the
right to sue is allocated, by current shareholder percentage limits, to managers and large
shareholders).
80. See Enriques, supra note 70, at 789. De Nicola similarly lists Articles 2409, 2408,
and 2388 as disincentives to use derivative suits. These suits can be "added to traditional
mechanisms of 'market' control that institutional investors are able to use at best." DE
NicoLA, supra note 3, at 240.
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2. The Failure of Italian Derivative Suits to Irritate
When implemented in 1998, derivative suits were designed to add
an additional protection for minority shareholders. The 1998 Testo
Unico della Finanza ("TUF") corporate reforms included several provi-
sions designed to strengthen the interests of minority shareholders.si
Teubner's theses, however, focus on the interaction of the new laws
with existing social structures and the strength of the law's connec-
tions with receptive parts of society. Thus, rather than simply looking
at impediments that have muted incentives to file derivative suits,
Teubner suggests that examining the failure of derivative suits to irri-
tate the social system will lead to a better understanding derivative suit
use.
The core component of Teubner's argument is that law is selec-
tively engaged with society at varying levels of intensity. Thus, changes
that irritate and interact with important social elements or affect
smaller social elements in a drastic fashion are more likely to evolve
and embed themselves within the new environment. It could be ex-
pected that importation of derivative suits be limited in its impact:
implementation is limited to shareholders with greater than 2.5%
ownership, a minority of the population, and topically far from the
mainstream. Teubner postulates that imported laws evolve due to con-
flictual interaction with social elements. Yet, the derivative suit mecha-
nism implemented in Italy is subdued, affronting no component of
society.
First, the laws relating to shareholder litigation limit the amount
of litigation. The filing costs can be prohibitive, and effectively inca-
pacitate derivative litigation, while the holding requirement is much
higher than other countries examined in this Article. 8 2 Derivative suits
appeal to two groups, lawyers and potential shareholder plaintiffs. In
terms of obvious social connections for the new law, derivative suits
are unlikely to irritate either of these groups. A substantial share-
holder must file the average derivative suit, and because they have
substantial holdings, it is likely this shareholder has access to manage-
ment's ear without the suit, and filing the suit will result in few private
81. But see Ventoruzzo, supra note 48, at 140 ("In sum, it cannot be said that the new
rules regarding withdrawal rights have significantly extended the ability of shareholders to
'vote with their feet.").
82. Both Japan and the United States effectively allow any shareholder to bring suit.
West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 61, at 354; DE NicoLA, supra note 3, at 33-36.
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benefits.83 Grechenig and Seykra have argued that high percentage
limits result in no derivative lawsuits and zero monitoring of corporate
actions.8 4 The holding requirement provides power to plaintiffs that
have the least need for it. In addition, other rights are given to share-
holders with significant holdings, including the right to challenge the
board resolutions listed above. These shareholder powers have been
used for demanding accountability of the board in the past and may
be more desirable substitutes.
Similarly, a potential lawyer would need to find such a party or
induce someone to purchase 2.5% of a company to file a suit. In the
United States, lawyers are incentivized to pursue derivative suits by the
possibility of recovering their legal fees. Derivative suits are often filed
by shareholders with small holdings and the complications of filing a
successful claim limit derivative suit utilization. The holding require-
ment significantly limits an Italian lawyer's ability to find possible
plaintiffs or create them. In Italy, the inability of small shareholders,
who have little influence with the corporate board, to use derivative
suits shows that there would be little social response to the new rules.
Without substantial public support for corporate accountability there
is little social pressure to take on these risks.
Second, unfavorable support structures have diminished the use
of derivative suits. This is a systematic argument made by Ventoruzzo 8 5
and Alessandro De Nicola.8 6 Foremost, the judiciary and political
structures have not proffered their support for derivative suit utiliza-
tion. One major component of effective enforcement is the judiciary.
In a civil legal system much of the onus lays on the judge.8 7 However,
Enriques' study of Italian judges raises several concerns about the en-
forcement of corporate law. First, the development of skilled judges is
limited prematurely: judges are not permitted to work on corporate
cases immediately after their legal training.88 Second, existing prac-
tices, such as the use of frivolous claims to gain a modicum of access to
courts89 and hard-to-read opinions,90 severely limit new judges' ability
83. Grechenig & Seykra, supra note 59 (arguing that shareholders with higher per-
centages have greater incentives to settle with management than file derivative suits).
84. Id.
85. Ventoruzzo, supra note 48, at 141.
86. De Nicola, supra note 3, at 238.
87. John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHi. L. REv. 823,
824 (1985).
88. See Enriques, supra note 70, at 775.
89. Id. at 777.
90. Id. at 809-10.
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to understand precedent and detailed legal issues. Finally, activist civil
law judges, who might work around these limitations, are generally
frowned upon.91 These systematic problems are a fundamental com-
ponent of the decision to file made by any potential plaintiff. By de-
creasing the likelihood of a successful resolution and increasing
plaintiff costs, these problems aggravate the difficulties for a share-
holder suit. In his empirical analysis, Enriques found "egregious cases
of deference to corporate insiders"92 in Italy. He expressed concerns
that courts rarely consider the substantive reasons for the dispute and
seldom care about the signaling effects or incentives that the cases
may have. 93
As an example, Italy illustrates how the impact of law, even bene-
ficial law, without social support is likely to be limited. Teubner argues
that law is defined by its differences with society and that the conflic-
tual interactions are what drives a new law's utilization in and adapta-
tion to the domestic system. Without a serious level of interaction, the
law remains inert. Social components, such as the small shareholder
that is the foundation for derivative suits in Japan and the United
States, have no incentive to utilize derivative suits. Thus, because of
the law's loose coupling with Italian social components, there is too
little irritation to promote adoption of the law into Italian
jurisprudence.
Looking forward, recent Italian reforms have significantly liberal-
ized the corporate governance options available. The changes, despite
offering a sometimes desirable degree of flexibility, will probably only
limit judicial effectiveness. In Italy, Teubner's dual-track model shows
that changes in the law combined with tepid social support will lead to
little change-the irritation is too subtle. 94 Worse yet, by placing inef-
fective law on the books, the legal revisions threaten to undermine the
legitimacy of Italian corporate law in general. Simple evaluations may
point to a preference for insiders in Italy as a cultural explanation or
declare Italy's legal system too barren for derivative suits to thrive.
Neither explanation is satisfactory-some of the non-derivative action
91. James Beardsley, Proof of Fact in French Civil Procedure, 34 Am. J. COMP. L. 459,
460-61 (1986).
92. Enriques, supra note 70, at 809.
93. Id. at 809-10.
94. One could also argue that Teubner's system is working exactly as predicted: the
initial 5% holding requirement was too high for social uptake. In response to this limited
impact, the legal holding requirement was reduced to 2.5%. From this perspective, even
no social response forces a legal change. See sources cited supra note 73 and accompanying
text.
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substitutes would permit flexibility in their interpretation if judges
would take risks. Similarly, judges might read outside the lines, as they
already do;95 with greater precedents and stronger minority share-
holder rights, minority shareholder suits might be more effective.
Likewise, massive social changes, such as a fall from grace for corpo-
rate players, might further shift the cost-benefit analysis in favor of
derivative suits.
B. Derivative Suits in Japan
Japan's corporate world has changed substantially over the last
twenty years, along with its corporate law. Following the end of the
bubble economy of the 1980s, Japan revised its corporate law in starts
and stops, culminating in the 2006 New Company Law. The new law
focused on increasing corporate governance flexibility and moderniz-
ing laws that lagged behind Japan's corporate growth. The changes
were also designed to recognize the massive changes that occurred in
Japan, including rapid "norm deterioration, '96 compounded by the
precipitous decline of off-the-books corporate governance mecha-
nisms, like cross-shareholding, 97 and the growing cultural acceptance
of hostile takeovers. 98
Japan provides a good comparison to Italy and the United States.
The United States strongly influenced Japanese corporate law and,
though technically a civil law country, Japan continues to show strong
similarities to the United States. The similarities to American law have
prompted people to question why derivative suits in Japan have not
been utilized in a similar fashion until recently. Like Italy, Japan did
not utilize derivative suits, totaling less than twenty suits between 1950
and 1990, 99 until 1993, when the filing requirements for derivative
suits were changed. Unlike Italy, the change in Japanese filing re-
quirements precipitated a 10,000% increase in the number of deriva-
tive suits filed.' 00 Moreover, unlike Italy, Japan has a strong reputation
95. Enriques, supra note 70 at 772, 785.
96. Curtis J. Milhaupt, Creative Norm Destruction: The Evolution of Nonlegal Rules in Japa-
nese Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 2083 (2001).
97. FUMIO KUROKI, THE RELATIONSHIP OF COMPANIES AND BANKS AS CROSS-SHAREHOLD-
INGS UNWIND-FISCAL 2002 CROSS-SHAREHOLDING SURVEY 6 (2003), available at http://
ww.nli-research.co.jp/english/economics/2003/ecoO3l118.pdf (noting that between
1992 and 2002, cross-holding by value declined from 17.8% to 7.4%, and that long-term
shareholding by value also decreased from 45.7% to 27.1%).
98. See Curtis J. Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware? The Rise of Hostile Takeovers in
Japan, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 2171, 2203 (2005).
99. West, Pricing of Actions, supra note 47, at 1438.
100. West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 61, at 352.
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for "good law," with favorable results in the Law and Finance survey in
regards to corruption and judicial efficiency.10 1
Recent increases in Japanese derivative suit usage allows for com-
parisons with Italy and the United States. Traditionally, Japanese cor-
porate governance has been considered "insular and conservative,"
beholden to its strong managerial roots.10 2 By reducing the filing fees
for bringing suit, derivative suits became financially viable for lawyers
and plaintiffs. In contrast with Italy, where the law is stymied by its
inaccessibility to likely plaintiffs, derivative suit reform interacted with
Japan's rapidly changing social norms to cause change and an active
derivative suit industry.
1. Japanese Derivative Suits
The mechanisms for enforcing derivative suits in Japan were up-
dated with the New Company Law, or shinkaishah. 10 3 This revised law
went into effect May 1, 2006, and consolidated many of the piecemeal
changes of the last decade. In particular, it unified the Japanese Com-
mercial Code, Law on Company Limited, and other laws into a single
Company Law. 10 4 Still, like before, shareholder actions are available in
101. Japan scored 10 for judicial efficiency and 8.52 for corruption, and had similar
shareholder rights to the United States. La Porta et al., supra note 40, at 1130-31, 1143,
1147.
102. RonaldJ. Gilson & CurtisJ. Milhaupt, Choice as Regulatory Reform: The Case ofJapa-
nese Corporate Governance, 53 AM. J. CoRP,. L. 343 (2005).
103. Kaishah6 [Company Law], supra note 6.
104. Shareholders in Japan: Pick Your Poison, ECoNoMIsT, June 11, 2005, at 97 ('Japan's
business leaders are pressing for more clarity about the rules of corporate control and the
limits of shareholders' rights.").
The New Company Law was notable for several reasons. First, it defined new catego-
ries of companies that reaffirmed the divide between Japanese-style and American-style
companies. Under the Company Law, there are four major company classifications: a gen-
eral partnership, a limited liability partnership, a limited liability company, and kabushiki
kaisha (or business corporation). Kaishah6 [Company Law], supra note 6. The kabushiki
kaisha is further divided into large and small/midsize public and private corporations. Id. It
also includes the tokurei yfigen kaisha, which replaces the yigen kaisha classification that was
previously used. Id.
Second, the New Company Law allowed for two different governance structures: the
traditional Japanese auditor system, or a Western-style board. Id. It could thus be argued
that these changes indicate that existing corporate governance structure and company
styles will be permitted in the future. Rather than substantially change the system, the
Company Law continues a policy of providing flexibility to managers. This includes a re-
duction of regulations for small and midsize companies and a general easing of require-
ments. Companies can continue to use the traditional Japanese system if it suits their
interests. By emphasizing flexibility, the New Company Law fits within an enabling frame-
work-rather than pushing any single approach, the Japanese laws defer to management
and tailoring approaches for each company.
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Japan under three different mechanisms. 10 5 The first, covered in Arti-
cle 847, provides for a traditional derivative suit, where a shareholder
who has continuously held shares for six months or longer (unless a
shorter period is provided in the articles of incorporation) can de-
mand a filing against the corporation members' 06 requiring the re-
turn of profits to the company. 10 7 Second, Article 968 parallels the
former Article 294-4 by providing penalties for permitting sikaiya'0 8
abuses, which include inappropriately participating in shareholder
meetings or abusing other shareholder rights.10 9 Finally, Article 164 of
the Financial Instruments and Exchange Law allows a shareholder to
sue a director or major shareholder to disgorge short swing profits.'10
The Company Law also contains restrictions on director and executive
Third, the new laws provided new regulations for mergers and acquisitions that offer
stronger hostile takeover protections and legal recognition for techniques that were ambig-
uous under earlier laws. These new laws simultaneously simplified the merger process and
were designed to promote more M&A activity. Tetsushi Kajimoto, New Corporate Law to
Foster Additional M&As, JAPAN TIMES, May 3, 2006, available at http://search.japantimes.
co.jp/cgi-bin/nb20060503a2.html.
105. AJapan External Trade Organization ("JETRO") article commented that the new
corporate law still has limitations in terms of holding the board to task. "There is no legal
system for class action lawsuits[:] No securities class action lawsuits[;] [o]nly derivative ac-
tions where the award is paid to the company[; and] [n]o system of 'discovery' that can be
used to uncover evidence of director malfeasance, violations of fiduciary duty." NICHOLAS
BENES, JAPAN's NEW COMPANY LAW: ITS IMPACT ON GOVERNANCE, M&A, AND FDI 7 (2006),
available at http://www.jetro.org/documents/eventdocuments/173/173-ACCJBENES_
6-30-06j1.pdf.
106. Article 847 references Article 423, which includes directors, accounting referees,
statutory auditors, executive officers, and accounting auditors. Sh6h6 [Commercial Code],
art. 847 (Japan). Thus, even audit firms can be targets for derivative suits. BENES, supra note
105, at 3.
107. This was formerly handled in Articles 267 through 268-3 of the former Commer-
cial Code. West, Pricing of Actions, supra note 47, at 1446 n.37.
108. Sokaiya are professional shareholders who either extort management or intimi-
date other shareholders for profit. See id. at 1450-52; see also generally KENNETH SZYMKOWIAK
SOKArYA, EXTORTION, PROTECTION AND THE JAPANESE CORPORATION (2002) (providing a
more colorful and in depth account of the history of sokaiya).
109. Sh6h6 [Commercial Code], art. 968-1 (Japan).
110. Id. art. 164 (translation on file with author). Article 164 provides: (1) In order to
prevent the inappropriate utilization of secrets acquired by the officers and primary share-
holders of listed companies due to their positions and the certain marketable securities
held by such persons, in the event that a profit is realized for shares that are sold within 6
months of the purchase of securities based on the individual's estimates or the purchase of
shares within 6 months of a sale, the listed company will demand the benefit be provided
to the listed company; (2) [i]n the event that the listed company does not make the de-
mand within 60 days of the date they are supposed to make the demand according to the
regulations in paragraph (1), the shareholders (including employees that are policyhold-
ers and investors) of such listed company can vicariously make the demand; and (3) [t] he
right of to make such demand against the officers and primary shareholders of such listed
company described in paragraph (1) will expire 2 years after the date of the benefit. Id.
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behavior that are familiar to Western commentators, including restric-
tions on self-dealing11' and liability for breaches of the duties of care
and loyalty." 12
Descriptions of Japanese derivative suits are heavily indebted to
Mark West, a professor at the University of Michigan Law School. In
his initial article in 1994, West argued that "although culture may play
some role in explaining actor behavior, decisions on whether to bring
derivative actions are primarily determined not by culture, but by eco-
nomics." 3 In particular, West focused on an internal claim-that
cheaper substitutes dominated derivative suits-and external claims-
different rules significantly reduced litigation in comparison with the
United States. 14 These played a primary role in the cost-benefit trade-
off that West felt was important in limiting derivative suit use in Japan
prior to 1993: substitutes were less costly than derivative suits.
As noted earlier, shareholder suits increased by 10,000% after the
1993 amendments. The catalyst for this dramatic increase was the re-
duction of the derivative suit filing fee to V8,200 (approximately
$70.46),115 from the previous practice of using higher rates estab-
lished by a schedule. 1 6 West comments, however, that despite the in-
crease in filings, the success rate ofJapanese derivative suits has been,
Japan revised its securities laws in 2006, largely in response to domestic corporate
scandals, including the live door bid for Fuji Television and Kanebo. Katharine Hyde, J-
SOX Readiness: Potential Impact and U.S. SOX Lessons Learned, JAPAN SOCIETY, Feb. 22, 2007,
http://www.japansociety.org/j-sox-readiness-potential-impact and-us-sox-lessons_
learned (summarizing the discussions of a moderated panel of experts on corporate fi-
nance and risk management); see also Yuriko Nagano,Japan Takes First Step IntoJ-SOX World,
COMPLIANCE WEEK, Sept. 25, 2007, http://www.complianceweek.com/article/3712/japan-
takes-first-step-into-j-sox-world. The revisions consolidated and harmonized several Japa-
nese securities laws, while imposing Sarbanes-Oxley-style penalties for market fraud. See id.
This protection was previously provided by Article 189 of the Securities and Exchange Law,
as discussed by Mark West. See West, Pricing of Actions, supra note 47, at 1454. This provision
is similar to Section 16(b) of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Id.
111. Sh6h6 [Commercial Code], Art. 356 (Japan).
112. Id. art. 423.
113. West, Pricing of Actions, supra note 47, at 1441.
114. Id. The substitutes included injunctions, removal of directors, settlement, general
griping, and exit. Id. at 1443.
115. This calculation assumes an exchange rate of 116.36 yen to the dollar, which was
the average exchange rate between 1995 and 2005. U.S.-Japan Average Annual Exchange
Rate, http://www.mac.doc.gov/japan/statistics/exchange.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2009).
116. The change is discussed more extensively in West, Pricing of Actions, supra note 47,
at 1463-65. In particular, a suit claiming $ 7.7 million in damages under the prior rules
would require $24,000 in revenue stamps to be filed. Id. This placed a hefty price on poten-
tial litigants. In 1993, however, the Tokyo High Court held that fees should be based off a
V950,000 claim when recovery was indeterminate-hence the Y8,200 filing fee. Id.
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as in the United States, "abysmal." 117 In particular, the data set in-
cluded 73 suits: 2 plaintiff victories, 10 settlements, and 20 defendant
victories or plaintiff withdrawals, with the remainder still pending.11 8
Results with this sample paralleled Romano's survey in the 1980s: de-
rivative suits did not cause significant price movements and sharehold-
ers did not expect to receive any significant gains from a filing.119
Severe director misconduct was a frequent precondition to a settle-
ment. 120 In conclusion, West noted that (1) Japan follows the United
States in not providing significant increases in shareholder wealth;
and (2) that the monetary incentives associated with the United States
were not necessary to promote litigation. 21
The rapid change introduces a number of interesting questions.
Foremost, much of West's earlier analysis focused on procedural bur-
dens that inhibited use of derivatives, such as poor cost-benefit trade
offs for potential plaintiffs, limited discovery, and so on. Yet the
change in filing fees indicates that these burdens might not bear
evenly on potential plaintiffs-certain reforms might significantly in-
crease the amount of derivative suits. West recognized the changes
and, in his second article in 2001, significantly updated his analysis.
West found that Japan had developed an active derivative suits indus-
try, but with similar problems and patterns to the United States. This
indicates that the lack of discovery and American litigiousness is not
fatal. Yet, the question of why a simple fee change was sufficient to
jump-start the Japanese derivatives industry remains.
In his initial analysis, West highlighted a number of impediments
that limited the effectiveness of derivative suits in Japan. Some impedi-
ments that inhibited potential litigants include significant initial legal
fees, lack of appropriate incentives for Japanese lawyers to bring
suits, 12 2 a system where the losing party pays, lack of discovery, disad-
117. West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 61, at 361.
118. Id. at 357. Recall that 83 of 128 suits discussed in Romano's survey resulted in a
settlement. Romano, supra note 1, at 57, 60.
119. West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 61, at 359.
120. Id. at 362.
121. Id. at 381-82.
122. West, Pricing of Actions, supra note 47, at 1462 ("[T]he inability of the Japanese
system to channel the rewards of private enforcement to the bengoshi effectively raises the
price of derivative litigation relative to the price of the same action in the United States,
not only for the plaintiff but for the bengoshi as well.").
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vantageous informational asymmetries, certain legal rules, and the
abuse of rights doctrine.1 23
2. Social Irritation by Changes to Japanese Derivatives Laws
Significant changes in the social irritation caused by derivative
suits resulted in a role for derivative suits in Japan. The drastic reac-
tion to filing fee changes is only one component of the significant
social change that irritated Japan's corporate governance mecha-
nisms. At the time, traditional Japanese corporate governance mecha-
nisms were unraveling, destroying much of the mystique of the
paternalistic corporation. This is a perfect example of Teubner's dual
track system, where co-evolutionary trajectories influence each other:
legal changes caused and irritated social changes, which in turn re-
sponded, leading to a narrative whereby change became self-perpetu-
ating. The traditional main bank system of corporate governance was
declining in the 1990s and many of the company cross-holdings also
began to unravel. 124 In this situation, the changes to the derivative
suits filing fees fit into an active social discourse. Moreover, the low
filing fee helped tip the cost-benefit analysis in favor of shareholder
action. Thus, one of the major ingredients for an active narrative be-
tween the reformed law and society was satisfied by the timing of the
derivative suit reforms.
The modification of the filing requirements for derivative suits
irritated previously impotent social segments of Japan, such as plain-
tiffs with small holdings. It was previously argued that the 2.5% filing
threshold in Italy was too high to permit an active derivative suits in-
dustry. In Japan, the derivative suit filing fee probably played a similar
role by significantly increasing the costs for potential plaintiffs. The
relation between perceived costs and benefits is more striking when
West's results are examined. One of the residual explanations for de-
123. To some degree, these complaints mirror those voiced by Marco Ventoruzzo in
regards to the failings of Italian corporate law. See supra Part III.A (discussing the deficien-
cies of Italian corporate law).
124. Masahiko Aoki describes the Japanese main bank system, in which a firm's lenders
provided necessary corporate governance. See MASAHIKO AoI, THEJAPANESE FirM: SOURCES
OF COMPETITIVE STRENGTH 20-22 (Masahiko Aoki & Ronald Dore eds., 1996). Yet, by the
time of this writing, all of the banks to which Aoki refers in his book have either merged or
gone bankrupt. At least three of Aoki's main banks, Sanwa Bank, Tokai Bank, and Mitsu-
bishi Bank, were combined in the resulting Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Limited. MITSU-
BISHI UFJ FIN. GROUP, 2007 CORPORATE REVIEw 4, available at http://www.mufg.jp/ir/
annualreport/2007mufg/pdffile/cr0704.pdf ("Recent Histroy of MUFG"). Most of the re-
maining players were absorbed into the Mitsui-Sumitomo bank or redeveloped under a
new name. See AoKI, supra, at 20-22.
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rivative suits in Japan is nonmonetary motives, including justice and
environmental activism. 125 Legal changes empowered this pool of
plaintiffs who had no similar recourse outside of derivative suits. 126
Lawyers have benefited from modifications to derivative suits fil-
ing laws. West provides several examples of lawyers collecting fees of
approximately 10% in his survey. 127 West conjectured that lawyers
could significantly improve their possibility of success by cherry pick-
ing the best cases. The plaintiff's ability to "piggyback" on public pros-
ecutor cases aided in this process. The availability of derivative suits
corresponded with an increase in public prosecutor actions against
corrupt corporations. 128 Plaintiffs often follow public prosecutorial ac-
tion, piggybacking on a successful action to gain access to information
and exploit a successful ruling for derivative suit success. 129 The legal
change was sufficient to make a previously disinterested group take
the risk for financial gain.
In addition, filers were able to exploit numerous supportive social
elements. The derivative suit reforms were tied to several diverse parts
of society, each of which provided support for the implementation
and use of derivative suits. This included political support and, due to
public prosecutor suits, cost reduction. An increase in derivative suit
litigation was supported by ruling politicians. Following the 1980s, Ja-
pan has increasingly attempted to update its corporate law to meet
international standards, while trimming the corporate fat and remov-
ing the skeletons accumulated during the bubble era. Derivative suits
have played an important role in reducing corporate fraud, with most
consistent success in "obviously" bad cases. This interpretation is con-
sistent withJ. Mark Ramseyer's argument thatJapanese courts bend to
125. The primary motive was attorney fees, but also included sokaiya suits, insurance-
settlement motivations, and public enforcement. West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 61,
at 372.
126. Whether these are ideal derivative-suit plaintiffs is a different issue. One of the
arguments against lower thresholds is that they will promote strike suits motivated not by
change, but by a desire for quick settlements.
127. He found 11% fees for the Shareholder Ombudsman group, 8% fees for a case in
the Kobe District Court, and 9% fees for a settlement. West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note
61, at 367-69.
128. Id. at 378.
129. SeeJ. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach,
23J. LEGAL STUD. 721 (1994). Building on the work by William Landes and Richard Pos-
ner, politicians will keep courts independent if they expect elections to continue indefi-
nitely and they continue to win. Independent courts will only be promoted if continued
elections are likely and victory is unlikely. Id. at 722. These judges can be controlled by
Japan's primary political party, the Liberal Democratic Party, using the judge renewal pro-
cess and relocation scheme to promote supporters and distance detractors. Id. at 725.
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political will. 130 The willingness of Japanese courts to hear derivative
claims and side with shareholders, at least in the most egregious cases,
created benefits for potential plaintiffs.' 3' This also forced major
changes in the business culture of Japanese corporations and a grow-
ing awareness of fiduciary duties owed to shareholders.
These beneficial elements have been significant in promoting
ongoing discourse between the law and society. Teubner argues that
ties between law and society are defined by difference, and that law
and society evolve through conflicting interactions. Thus, for law to be
relevant in society it must act and react to social forces. The Japanese
example highlights these interactions: the initial law prompted legal
actions, which were supported by judicial support and indicators for
likely targets that could be exploited by plaintiffs. These plaintiffs
were rewarded with a number of big recoveries. The most famous ex-
ample is the Daiwa Bank case: massive losses caused by a rogue trader
at Daiwa Bank in New York resulted in a $775 million fee for filing
misleading financial reports with the Ministry of Finance.1 32 In addi-
tion, several suits have settled for significant amounts, indicating at
least some valid concerns about paying out a damages claim.1
33
Should these recoveries grow too large or suits too burdensome, it is
130. Id. at 722.
131. One lawyer returning to practice in Japan in the late 1990s commented:
The first actor is the Japanese judge. I noticed that at the end of many projects,
my clients would ask me, "Can the directors be sued?" This was the first time to
hear this question in Japan. Shareholder derivative suits were now possible be-
cause the filing fee had been lowered in 1993 to only 8200 yen. Shareholders
could now sue and win, and the directors would get nailed. So the president of a
company might get angry if a deal didn't take place, but that was nothing com-
pared to the threat of a lawsuit for a dumb deal. The Japanese judge had been
brought into the drama, which forced people to consider shareholder value,
whether they wanted to or not. There have been some recent revisions to the
rules on these lawsuits in the company law. One problem with the revisions is that
the company can now side with the company director during these suits. This is
entirely inconsistent with the concept of these suits-they are to determine whether
the director has harmed the company. The revisions also provide new settlement
procedures, but there could be more disclosure in connection with settlement so
as to prevent collusion between management and plaintiff shareholders. But in
any event, overall the judge is still the most important actor in Japanese corporate
governance.
E. Anthony Zaloom, Mori Sogo Law Offices, Japanese Corporate Governance: Moving in
the Right Direction or Dead in the Water?, Remarks at the Research Institute of Economy,
Trade & Industry Brown Bag Lunch Seminar (July 12, 2002), available at http://
w.rieti.go.jp/en/events/bbl/02071201 .html.
132. Milhaupt, supra note 96, at 2115-16.
133. See West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 61, at 363 tbl.4.
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likely that the burden would shift back to legal remedies and the con-
flictual social narrative would continue.
In Japan, the legal change was significant to prompt a social re-
sponse. By reducing the requirements for filing a suit, both lawyers
and shareholders were able to access derivative suits. This is the type
of social irritation that one would expect from a significant legal
change. The decrease in fees made derivative suits more accessible,
although the utilization has been by different types of plaintiffs than
in the United States. Similarly, an up-front fee retainer structure has
motivated lawyers to make the practice profitable. This is dissimilar
from the American model but consistent with Teubner's thesis of im-
ported law reacting differently from the original.1 3 4
IV. Thoughts Relating to the Italian and Japanese Examples
One argument that frequently occurs in comparative analyses is
that cultural tendencies play a strong role in the successful importa-
tion of law. Yet both of these examples indicate that purely cultural
factors have minimal influence on the acceptance of derivative suits.
Rather, social relevance has been decisive in the success of importing
derivative suits. In Japan, a cultural preference for non-litigious solu-
tions was thought to play a major role in the lack of derivative litiga-
tion, especially due to the strong similarities between the United
States andJapanese derivative suit mechanisms. However, the increase
in suits following the change in the filing fee indicates that economic
factors, rather than cultural distaste, were the deciding factor. This
may hold lessons for Italy, where attributing the complete lack of de-
rivative suits in Italy to cultural factors, like a preference for insiders,
might distract one from the serious procedural impediments to share-
holder litigation.
One element discussed in the previous two sections is the accessi-
bility of derivative suits. West's survey indicated that several suits were
filed for nonmonetary reasons. More specifically, interviewees file suits
to express their anger over corporate scandals and environmental ac-
tivism. 135 Whether these are valid suits that should be promoted by
legal reforms is one question. However, that legal change irritated cer-
tain components of society that had previously been inert is incontro-
vertible. In addition, the lower filing fee was sufficient to change the
cost-benefit analysis for lawyers and promote a viable derivative suits
134. Id. at 381.
135. Id. at 372.
Winter 2009]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
plaintiff bar. In contrast, the precondition for filing in Italy is being a
substantial shareholder in a company: 2.5% in a public firm and 20%
in a private one. This threshold quickly removes some equivalent
plaintiffs to those that had filed in Japan and creates prohibitive barri-
ers to purchasing a sufficient number of shares to file a suit for plain-
tiffs and potential lawyers. 136 In addition, the derivative suit does not
create a new means of censuring corporate players-participants with
2.5% of the shares have access to other mechanisms. 137
The critical role played by different fragments of society, like en-
vironmental activists, supports the idea that disparate social forces are
decisive in the importation of derivative suits and their successful
adoption. One argument is that political willpower is necessary to pro-
vide laws that are accessible enough to invite shareholder action and
that the social climate must be supportive enough for politicians to
spurn business interests and develop a law with teeth. Such laws will
then be dependent on political and social support for their successful
implementation. For example, in Japan, the poor, post-bubble econ-
omy lead to a break in Liberal Democratic Party rule and corre-
sponded with a political push for increased prosecution of corporate
corruption. The improved access to derivative suits was part of a
strong social push for more effective punishment for corporate mal-
feasance. This is in contrast to some degree with Teubner's theses
which he distinguished from Kahn-Freund by minimizing the role of a
strong political state. 138 Kahn-Freund argued that the political state
was the primary agent for change, while Teubner asserts that the legal
narrative with society broadly defined, determines the interpretation
of the law. 13 9
Derivative suits have become useful tools for shareholders due to
the decrease in filing costs. In comparison with Italian derivative suits,
the significance of Japanese achievements is evident. By setting low
bars to litigation-and arguably allowing frivolous suits-Japan has
turned derivative suits into a punitive item, if not a legitimate action,
136. In contrast, Article 2377 requires only one one-thousandth of a firm's publicly
traded stock to challenge a resolution. Italian Civil Code, supra note 73, art. 2377.
137. As noted supra Part III.A, this includes four shareholder litigation mechanisms
available to shareholders. Italy has also finally moved forward with a class action law that
may provide a different option for aggrieved individuals without significant holdings. See
Cristina Pagni, Italy: Class ofIts Own, LEGAL WEEK, June 26, 2008, http://www.legalweek.
com/Navigation/20/Articles/1139203/Italy+Class+of+ts+own.html.
138. Teubner, supra note 8, at 18.
139. Id. at 22 ("Kahn-Freund singled out the political power discourse as law's primary
link to society.... [T]his seems to overestimate the importance of the political system at
the expense of other social systems.").
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for aggrieved shareholders. This resembles Teubner's thesis, that laws
will be adopted but their eventual form might differ significantly from
the original transplant. Japan has also started to develop something
lacking in Italian law: living law, with judges experiencing cases and
writing case law.
This may lead one to think that derivative suits, even in the Italian
form, are an improvement in corporate law. Especially in considera-
tion of the other remedies available to shareholders under the Italian
Civil Code, it is essential that derivative suits are liberalized sufficiently
to irritate a broader spectrum of society. Even in their latent form,
corporate laws like Italy's can potentially morph, with sufficient social
pressure, into effective law. Under Teubner's argument, law and soci-
ety are constantly in contact, with social aggravations leading to legal
responses. One may hope that with social, or perhaps international
business pressure, Italian law may flip like Japan. The Japanese exam-
ple indicates that simply reducing expected costs can seriously in-
crease the litigation. The Italian court system's inability to easily adapt
remains another question.
Conclusion
Derivative suits have almost faded from the pages of law reviews
and their insignificance has been thoroughly analyzed. Yet a compara-
tive analysis paints a considerably more interesting picture. The Japa-
nese example should be sufficient to make one reconsider the
existing incentive structure in the United States and how necessary it
is for laws to irritate some social component, assuming that the desire
is for the new law to be utilized. Meanwhile, Italy's example in the
derivative lawsuits context should highlight the importance of lower-
ing the bars for litigation, which will at least raise the stature of deriva-
tive litigation and contribute to a culture of accountability.
Overall, these examples should make one reconsider the cultural
dependencies of laws and how to import good law. Many of the cul-
tural impediments and systematic inadequacies blamed for poor deriv-
ative suits uptake were not dispositive in these international contexts.
Rather, it was essential that imported law interact with and irritate a
heretofore unaffected part of society. In Japan, the lowering of filing
fees made derivative suits financially possible for new plaintiffs. In
contrast, derivative suits in Italy are no more accessible than previ-
ously available remedies, adding little to the remedies available to Ital-
ian shareholders. This illustrates how essential it is for imported law to
irritate social elements as proposed by Teubner. The development of
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the Japanese derivative suit industry shows how society responds to
new laws and how law responds to society's input to create a co-evolv-
ing legal discourse. In the United States, derivative suits have an estab-
lished role versus other shareholder remedies and Japan is finding a
role for its derivative suits. Italy continues to modify its derivative suits
laws and, with time, it too might find that making the law more acces-
sible enervates the social response and causes further changes to the
law.
